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Abstract
A fundamental problem with the Nash equilibrium concept is the existence
of certain “structurally deficient” equilibria that (i) lack fundamental robust-
ness properties, and (ii) are difficult to analyze. The notion of a “regular”
Nash equilibrium was introduced by Harsanyi. Such equilibria are isolated,
highly robust, and relatively simple to analyze. A game is said to be regular if
all equilibria in the game are regular. In this paper it is shown that almost all
potential games are regular. That is, except for a closed subset with Lebesgue
measure zero, all potential games are regular. As an immediate consequence
of this, the paper also proves an oddness result for potential games: in almost
all potential games, the number of Nash equilibrium strategies is finite and
odd. Specialized results are given for weighted potential games, exact poten-
tial games, and games with identical payoffs. Applications of the results to
game-theoretic learning are discussed.
Keywords: Game theory, Regular equilibrium, Potential games,
Multi-agent systems
1. Introduction
While the notion of Nash equilibrium (NE) is a universally accepted solu-
tion concept for games, several shortcomings have been noted over the years.
A principal criticism (in addition to non-uniqueness) is that some Nash equi-
librium strategies may be undesirable or unreasonable due to a lack of basic
robustness properties. As a consequence, many equilibrium refinement con-
cepts have been proposed [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7], each attempting to single out
subsets of Nash equilibrium strategies that satisfy some desirable criteria.
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One of the most stringent refinement concepts, originally proposed by
Harsanyi [3], is that a NE strategy be “regular.” In the words of van Damme
[4], “regular Nash equilibria possess all the robustness properties that one
can reasonably expect equilibria to possess.” Such equilibria are quasi-strict
[3, 4], perfect [1], proper [2], strongly stable [6], essential [5], and isolated
[4].1
If all equilibria of a game are regular, then the number of NE strategies
in the game has been shown to be finite and, curiously, odd [3, 8]. Regu-
lar equilibria have also been studied in the context of games of incomplete
information, where, as part of Harsanyi’s celebrated purification theorem
[9, 10, 11], they have been shown to be approachable.
A game is said to be regular if all equilibria in the game are regular.
Harsanyi [3] showed that almost all2 games are regular, and hence, in al-
most all games, all equilibria possess all the robustness properties we might
reasonably hope for.
While this result is a powerful when targeted at general N -player games,
there are many important classes of games that have Lebesgue measure zero
within the space of all games [12]. Harsanyi’s result tells us nothing about
equilibrium properties within such special classes of games. This is the case,
for example, in the important class of multi-agent games known as potential
games [13].
A game is said to be a potential game if there exists some underlying func-
tion (generally referred to as the potential function) that all players implicitly
seek to optimize. Potential games have many applications in economics and
engineering [14, 13], and are particularly useful in the study of multi-agent
systems, e.g., [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
There are several types of potential games—in order of decreasing gen-
erality, these include weighted potential games, exact potential games, and
games with identical payoffs [13, 26].3 Letting WPG, EPG, and GIP denote
the set of each of these types of potential games respectively, and letting G
1See [4] for an in depth discussion of each of these concepts and their interrelationships.
2Following Harsanyi [3], when we say almost all games satisfy some condition we mean
the set of games where the condition fails to hold is a closed set with Lebesgue measure
zero. See Section 2.2 for more details.
3More general sets of potential games include ordinal potential games [13] and best
response potential games [27]. In this paper we will focus on weighted potential games
and subsets thereof.
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denote the set of all games, we have the following relationship:4
GIP ⊂ EPG ⊂WPG ⊂ G,
where each subset is a low-dimensional (measure-zero) subset within any of
its supersets. Harsanyi’s regularity result provides no information on the
abundance (or dearth) of regular equilibria within these subclasses of games.
Hence, when restricting attention to potential games, as is often done in the
study of multi-agent systems, we are deprived of any generic results on the
regularity, robustness, or finiteness of the equilibrium set.
We say that a property holds for almost all games in a given class if the
subset of games in the class where the property fails to holds is a closed set
with Lebesgue measure zero (with the dimension of the Lebesgue measure
corresponding to the dimension of the given class of games—see Section 2.2
for more details).
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1.
(i) Almost all weighted potential games are regular.
(ii) Almost all exact potential games are regular.
(iii) Almost all games with identical payoffs are regular.
We note that this result implies that for almost all games in each of
these classes, all equilibria are quasi-strict, perfect, proper, strongly stable,
essential, and isolated. Using Harsanyi’s oddness theorem (see [3], Theorem
1), we see that in any regular game, the number of NE strategies is finite and
odd. Hence, the following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. In almost all weighted potential games, almost all exact poten-
tial games, and almost all games with identical payoffs, the number of NE
strategies is finite and odd.
Regularity may be seen as serving two purposes. First, it ensures that
the equilibrium set possesses the desirable structural properties noted above
4More precisely, any finite game of a fixed size (i.e., with a fixed number of players
and actions) is uniquely represented as a vector in Euclidean space denoting the payoff
received by each player for each pure strategy. The set G of all possible games of a given
size is equal to Rm for some appropriatem ∈ N (see, e.g., [28] Section 12.1), and each class
of potential games is a lower-dimensional subset of Rm. See Section 2.2 for more details.
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(e.g., equilibria are isolated, robust, and finite in number). Second, it simpli-
fies the analysis of the game near equilibrium points—the important features
of players’ utility functions near an equilibrium can be understood by looking
only at first- and second-order terms in the associated Taylor series expan-
sion. In this sense, the role of regular equilibria in games is analogous to
the role that non-degenerate critical points play in the study of real-valued
functions.5 This amenable analytic structure can greatly facilitate the study
of (for example) game-theoretic learning processes [29] or approachability in
games with incomplete information [10].
As an application of these results to learning theory, in the paper [29]
we consider the problem of studying continuous best-response dynamics (BR
dynamics) [30, 31, 32] in potential games. BR dynamics are fundamental to
learning theory—they model various forms of learning in games and under-
lie many popular game-theoretic learning algorithms including the canonical
fictitious play (FP) algorithm [33]. While it is known that BR dynamics con-
verge to the set of NE in potential games, the result is less than satisfactory.
BR dynamics can converge to mixed-strategy (saddle-point) Nash equilibria
and solutions of BR dynamics may be non-unique. Furthermore, little is
understood about transient properties such as the rate of convergence of BR
dynamics in potential games. (In fact, due to the non-uniqueness of solu-
tions in potential games, it has been shown that it is impossible to establish
convergence rate estimates for BR dynamics that hold at all points [34].)
In [29] we study how regular potential games can be used to address
these issues. In particular, it is shown that in any regular potential game,
BR dynamics converge generically to pure NE, solutions of BR dynamics are
generically unique, and the rate of convergence of BR dynamics is generically
exponential. Combined with the results of the present paper, this allows us
to show that BR dynamics are “well behaved” in almost all potential games.
Furthermore, in [26] Monderer and Shapley study the convergence of the
5A critical point x∗ of a function f : Rn → R is said to be non-degenerate if the Hessian
of f at x∗ is non-singular. When a critical point is non-degenerate, one can understand the
important local properties of f using only the gradient and Hessian of f . If a critical point
is degenerate then heavy algebraic machinery may be required to understand the local
properties of f . With regard to games, if x∗ is an interior equilibrium point of a potential
game with potential function U , then x∗ is regular if and only if x∗ is a non-degenerate
critical point of x∗. For non-interior equilibrium points the story is more involved, but the
main idea is the same.
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closely related FP algorithm in potential games and show convergence to the
set of NE. In particular, they show that it is possible for FP to converge to
completely mixed NE in potential games, which can be highly problematic
for a number of reasons [35, 36, 29]. However, they conjecture that such
behavior is exceptional; that is, they conjecture that in generic two-player
potential games FP always converges to pure NE (see [26], Section 2).6 Reg-
ular potential games are well suited to studying this conjecture. Theorem
1 of the present paper combined with Theorem 1 of [29] shows that for the
continuous-time version of FP [34, 38] (which is equivalent to BR dynamics
after a time change [34]), this conjecture holds generically for potential games
of arbitrary size; that is, in any regular potential game (and hence almost
all potential games) continuous-time FP dynamics converge to pure NE from
almost all initial conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.1 we
outline our strategy for proving Theorem 1. Section 2 sets up notation.
Section 3 introduces the notion of a regular equilibrium. Section 4 elucidates
the structure of regular equilibria in potential games and presents two simple
conditions that will allow us to verify if an equilibrium of a potential game
is regular. Section 5 proves that almost all games with identical payoffs are
regular (Proposition 3). Section 6 proves that almost all exact and weighted
potential games are regular (Proposition 31).
1.1. Proof Strategy
Our first step in proving Theorem 1 will be to prove the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 3. Almost all games with identical payoffs are regular.
This proposition accomplishes a majority of the work required to prove
Theorem 1. Once Proposition 3 is proved, the proof of parts (i)–(ii) of The-
orem 1 (which consider exact and weighted potential games) reduces to a
simple matter of identifying equivalence relationships between these classes
of games and identical-payoff games. This is accomplished in Section 6 after
proving Proposition 3 (see Proposition 31). Propositions 3 and 31 (along
with Proposition 11) prove Theorem 1.
6Since their reasoning relies on the improvement principle [37], which does not hold in
games with more than two players, they limit their conjecture to two-player games.
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Accordingly, the majority of the paper is focused on proving Proposition
3. Our strategy for proving Proposition 3 is as follows. An equilibrium in
an identical-payoffs game (or, more generally, in any potential game) can be
shown to be regular if and only if the derivatives of the potential function
satisfy two simple non-degeneracy conditions (see Section 3 and Lemma 22).
The first condition deals with the gradient of the potential function—we
refer to it as the first-order non-degeneracy condition. The second condi-
tion deals with the Hessian of the potential function—we refer to it as the
second-order non-degeneracy condition. We say a potential game is first-
order (second-order) non-degenerate if all equilibria in the game satisfy the
first-order (second-order) non-degeneracy condition.
We will prove Proposition 3 by showing that almost all games with iden-
tical payoffs are both first- and second-order non-degenerate. We proceed in
two steps. First, we will prove that almost all games with identical payoffs
are second-order non-degenerate (see Section 5.1 and Proposition 24). We
follow roughly the approach of [3, 39], setting up an appropriate mapping
into the space of N -player games with identical payoffs of a fixed size, and
proving that all second-order degenerate games are contained in the set of
critical values of the map. The result then follows from Sard’s Theorem [40].
We note, however, that the mapping used by Harsanyi [3] for general games
fails to give any useful information when restricted to games with identical
payoffs (see Remark 29). Consequently, our construction differs substantially
from Harsanyi’s in terms of the mapping used and some of the fundamental
technical tools used. Most significantly, we require a strong characterization
of the rank of the linear mapping that relates equilibrium points of a game
and the game utility structure (see (23) and Proposition 25). This character-
ization relies on (relatively) recent results on the signsolvability of matrices
[41], not available to Harsanyi. The case of identical-payoff games (and, more
generally, potential games) also differs from the general case in that it is not
possible to construct a single mapping a` la Harsanyi [3] whose critical values
set contains all degenerate games. Instead, we only utilize Sard’s theorem
locally in the space of games and then use a covering argument to obtain the
global result for all identical-payoff games.
As our second step in proving Proposition 3, we show that almost all
games with identical payoffs are first-order non-degenerate (see Section 5.2
and Proposition 30). In order to show this, we use our aforementioned char-
acterization of the rank of the linear mapping (see (23) and discussion above)
to construct a Lipschitz mapping from a set with low Hausdorff dimension
6
into the space of games with identical payoffs, such that the range of the map
contains all first-order degenerate games. The result then follows from the
fact that the graph of a Lipschitz mapping cannot have a higher Hausdorff
dimension than its domain ([42], Section 2.4.2).
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
Throughout the paper we will consider finite normal-form games, defined
as follows.
Definition 4. A game (in normal form) is given by a tuple
Γ := (N, (Yi, ui)i=1,...,N),
where N ∈ {2, 3, . . .} denotes the number of players, Yi := {y
1
i , . . . , y
Ki
i }
denotes the set of pure strategies (or actions) available to player i, with car-
dinality Ki := |Yi|, and ui :
∏N
j=1 Yj → R denotes the utility function of
player i.
Given some game Γ, let Y :=
∏N
i=1 Yi denote the set of joint pure strate-
gies available to players, and let
K := K1 × · · · ×KN (1)
denote the number of joint pure strategies. When defining spaces of games
(e.g., as in Section 2.2) we will find it convenient to view ui = (ui(y)y∈Y ) as
a vector in RK ; we will clearly indicate when using this abuse of notation.
For a finite set S, let △(S) denote the set of probability distributions
over S. For i = 1, . . . , N , let ∆i := △(Yi) denote the set of mixed-strategies
available to player i. Let ∆ :=
∏N
i=1∆i denote the set of joint mixed strate-
gies. Note that it is implicitly assumed that players’ mixed strategies are
independent; i.e., players do not coordinate. Let ∆−i :=
∏
j∈{1,...,N}\{i}∆j .
When convenient, given a mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σN ) ∈ ∆, we use the
notation σ−i to denote the tuple (σj)j 6=i
Given a mixed strategy σ ∈ ∆, the expected utility of player i is given by
Ui(σ1, . . . , σN) =
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σN (yN). (2)
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For σ−i ∈ ∆−i, the best response of player i is given by the set-valued
map BRi : ∆−i ⇒ ∆i,
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σi∈∆i
Ui(σi, σ−i),
where we use the symbol ⇒ to indicate a set-valued map. For σ ∈ ∆ the
joint best response is given by the set-valued map BR : ∆⇒ ∆,
BR(σ) := BR1(σ−1)× · · · × BRN(σ−N ).
A strategy σ ∈ ∆ is said to be a Nash equilibrium (NE) if σ ∈ BR(σ).
For convenience, we sometimes refer to a Nash equilibrium simply as an
equilibrium.
In this paper we will consider the following notions of a potential game
(cf. [13, 26]).
Definition 5 (Weighted Potential Game). We say that Γ is a weighted
potential game if there exists a function u : Y → R and a vector of positive
weights (wi)
N
i=1 ∈ R
N such that
ui(y
′
i, y−i)− ui(y
′′
i , y−i) = wi
(
u(y′i, y−i)− u(y
′′
i , y−i)
)
(3)
for all y−i ∈ Y−i and y
′
i, y
′′
i ∈ Yi, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Definition 6 (Exact Potential Game). We say that Γ is an exact potential
game if Γ is a weighted potential game with corresponding weights satisfying
wi = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Definition 7 (Game with Identical Payoffs). We say that Γ is a game with
identical payoffs (or an identical-payoffs game) if there exists a function
u : Y → R such that ui(y) = u(y) for all y ∈ Y and all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Note that any identical-payoffs game is an exact potential game, and any
exact potential game is a weighted potential game. When we refer simply to
a “potential game” we mean a weighted potential game, which includes the
other classes of games as special cases.
In a potential game there exists a potential function u : Y → R to which
all players utility functions are aligned. We note that, as with the utility
function ui, at times we will find it convenient to view u = (u(y)y∈Y ) as a
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vector in RK ; we will clearly indicate when using this abuse of notation. Let
U : ∆→ R be the multilinear extension of u defined by
U(σ1, . . . , σN) =
∑
y∈Y
u(y)σ1(y1) · · ·σ(yN). (4)
The function U may be seen as giving the expected value of u under the
mixed strategy σ = (σ1, . . . , σN). We refer to U as the potential function and
to u as the pure form of the potential function.
Using the definitions of Ui and U it is straightforward to verify that
BRi(σ−i) := arg max
σi∈∆i
Ui(σi, σ−i) = arg max
σi∈∆i
U(σi, σ−i). (5)
That is, any potential game is best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to
a game with identical payoffs. Thus, in order to compute the best response
set in a potential game we only require knowledge of the potential function
U , not necessarily the individual utility functions (Ui)i=1,...,N .
By way of notation, given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi and a mixed strategy
σ−i ∈ ∆−i, we will write U(yi, σ−i) to indicate the value of U when player i
uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the yi and the remaining players
use the strategy σ−i ∈ ∆−i.
Given a σi ∈ ∆i, let σ
k
i denote value of the k-th entry in σi, so that
σi = (σ
k
i )
Ki
k=1. Since the potential function is linear in each σi, if we fix any
i = 1, . . . , N we may express it as
U(σ) =
Ki∑
k=1
σki U(y
k
i , σ−i). (6)
In order to study learning dynamics without being (directly) encumbered
by the hyperplane constraint inherent in ∆i we define
Xi := {xi ∈ R
Ki−1 : 0 ≤ xki ≤ 1 for k = 1, . . . , Ki − 1, and
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki ≤ 1},
where we use the convention that xki denotes the k-th entry in xi so that
xi = (x
k
i )
Ki−1
k=1 .
Given xi ∈ Xi define the bijective mapping Ti : Xi → ∆i as Ti(xi) = σi
for the unique σi ∈ ∆i such that σ
k
i = x
k−1
i for k = 2, . . . , Ki and σ
1
i =
9
1−
∑Ki−1
k=1 x
k
i . For k = 1, . . . , Ki let T
k
i be the k-th component map of Ti so
that Ti = (T
k
i )
Ki
i=1.
Let X := X1 × · · · × XN and let T : X → ∆ be the bijection given by
T = T1 × · · · × TN . In an abuse of terminology, we sometimes refer to X as
the mixed-strategy space of Γ. When convenient, given an x ∈ X we use the
notation x−i to denote the tuple (xj)j 6=i. Letting X−i :=
∏
j 6=iXj , we define
T−i : X−i → ∆−i as T−i := (Tj)j 6=i.
Throughout the paper we will often find it convenient to work in X rather
than ∆. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible we overload the
definitions of some symbols when the meaning can be clearly derived from the
context. In particular, let BRi : X−i ⇒ Xi be defined by BRi(x−i) := {xi ∈
Xi : BRi(σ−i) = σi, σi ∈ ∆i, σ−i ∈ ∆−i, σi = Ti(xi), σ−i = T−i(x−i)}.
Similarly, given an x ∈ X we abuse notation and write U(x) instead of
U(T (x)).
Given a pure strategy yi ∈ Yi, we will write U(yi, x−i) to indicate the
value of U when player i uses a mixed strategy placing all weight on the yi
and the remaining players use the strategy x−i ∈ X−i. Similarly, we will say
yki ∈ BRi(x−i) if there exists an xi ∈ BRi(x−i) such that Ti(xi) places weight
one on yki .
Applying the definition of Ti to (6) we see that U(x) may also be expressed
as
U(x) =
Ki−1∑
k=1
xkiU(y
k+1
i , x−i) +
(
1−
Ki−1∑
k=1
xki
)
U(y1i , x−i). (7)
for any i = 1, . . . , N .
We use the following nomenclature to refer to strategies in X .
Definition 8. (i) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be pure if T (x) places all its
mass on a single action tuple y ∈ Y .
(ii) A strategy x ∈ X is said to be completely mixed if x is in the interior
of X.
(iii) In all other cases, a strategy x ∈ X is said to be incompletely mixed.
Other notation as used throughout the paper is as follows.
• N := {1, 2, . . .}.
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• The mapping sgn : Rn×m → Rn×m is given by
(sgn(A))i,j :=

1 if ai,j > 0
−1 if ai,j < 0
0 if ai,j = 0.
• Given two matrices A and B of the same dimension, A◦B denotes the
Hadamard product (i.e., the entrywise product) of A and B.
• Suppose m,n, p ∈ N, Fi : R
m × Rn → R, for i = 1, . . . , p. Suppose
further that F : Rm ×Rn → Rp is given by F (w, z) = (Fi(w, z))i=1,...,p.
Then the operator Dw gives the Jacobian of F with respect to the
components of w = (wk)k=1,...,m; that is
DwF (w, z) =

∂F1(w,z)
∂w1
· · · ∂F1(w,z)
∂wm
...
. . .
...
∂Fp(w,z)
∂w1
· · · ∂Fp(w,z)
∂wm
 .
• Ac denotes the complement of a set A, and A˚ denotes the interior of
A, and clA denotes the closure of A.
• The support of a function f : Ω → R is given by spt(f) := {x ∈ Ω :
f(x) 6= 0}.
• Given a function f , D(f) refers to the domain of f and R(f) to the
range of f .
• Ln, n ∈ {1, 2, . . .} refers to the n-dimensional Lebesgue measure.
2.2. Almost All Games
We say that a game Γ has size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) if Γ is an N -player game,
N ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, and the size of the action space of each player satisfies |Yi| =
Ki ∈ {2, 3, . . .}, i = 1, . . . , N . Let K be as defined in (1) so that K gives the
number of pure strategies in a game of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1).
A game of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) is uniquely represented by the vector
u := (ui(y))y∈Y, i=1,...,N ∈ R
NK which specifies the utility received by each
player for each pure strategy y ∈ Y . We will frequently refer to u as the
vector of utility coefficients.
Following Harsanyi [3], we define the notion of almost all games as follows.
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Definition 9 (Almost All Games).
(i) We say that almost all games of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) satisfy a given property
if the subset of games in RNK where the property fails to hold is a closed
subset of RNK with LNK-measure zero.
(ii) We say that almost all games satisfy a given property if, for arbitrary
game size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1), almost all games of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) satisfy the prop-
erty.
For convenience, we decompose the vector of utility coefficients u ∈ RNK
as u = (ui)
N
i=1, where ui ∈ R
K gives the pure strategy utility received by
player i for each pure strategy y ∈ Y . The set of weighted potential games
is given by
W :=
{
(ui)
N
i=1 ∈ R
NK : (3) holds for some u ∈ RK and some (wi)
N
i=1,
wi > 0, i = 1, . . . , N
}
.
the set of exact potential games is given by
P :=
{
(ui)
N
i=1 ∈ R
NK : (3) holds for some u ∈ RK with (wi)
N
i=1 = 1
}
,
where 1 denotes the vector of all ones. An identical-payoffs game is uniquely
represented as a vector u ∈ RK denoting the payoff (identical for all players)
received for each action y ∈ Y . We represent the set of games with identical
payoffs as
I := RK . (8)
We note, of course, that the set of games with identical payoffs can also be
viewed as a K-dimensional subspace in RNK . The set P is a linear subspace
of RNK defined by a finite number of equality constraints as prescribed in
(3) and Definition 6. Let Kw and Kp denote the dimension of W and P
respectively, so that P is isomorphic to RKp and W is isomorphic to a set in
RKw .
Definition 10 (Almost All Potential Games).
(i) We say that a property holds for almost all weighted potential games,
almost all exact potential games, or almost all games with identical payoffs
of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1), if the subset of games where the property fails to holds
is a closed subset of W, P or I (respectively) with LKw-measure zero, LKp-
measure zero, or LK-measure zero (respectively).
(ii) We say that a property holds for almost all games of a given class if, for
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arbitrary game size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1), the property holds for almost all games of
size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) in the class.
It was shown by Harsanyi [3, 4] that the set of irregular games (discussed
in the next section) of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) is a closed subset in the space of all
games of size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1). This result readily extends to potential games. In
particular, since the sets of exact potential games and identical payoff games
are closed subspaces in RKN , it immediately follows that the set of irregular
games in each of these classes is a closed set with respect to the given class
of games. Furthermore, the set of irregular weighted potential games can be
viewed as an intersection of sets that are closed with respect to W and is
itself closed with respect to W. We thus get the following proposition.
Proposition 11 (Closedness in Regular Games).
(i) The set of irregular weighted potential games is closed with respect to W.
(ii) The set of irregular exact potential games is closed with respect to P.
(iii) The set of irregular games with identical payoffs is closed with respect
to I.
For practical purposes this means that in order to verify that almost all
potential games of a given class are regular (per Definition 10), we need
only verify that the subset of irregular games has appropriately dimensioned
Lebesgue measure zero.
3. Regular Equilibria
The notion of a regular equilibrium was originally introduced by Harsanyi
[3]. Subsequently, these equilibria were studied by van Damme [43, 4], who
introduced a slightly modified definition of a regular equilibrium that is gen-
erally standard today. Informally, an equilibrium is said to be regular if the
Jacobian of a certain differentiable mapping is non-singular. This standard
definition of regularity is introduced below. In the following section we will
focus our attention to potential games where we will see that, in potential
games, the notion of a regular equilibrium takes on a more intuitive meaning.
We will now formally define the notion of a regular equilibrium as given
in [43, 4]. Let the game size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1) be fixed. We begin by defining the
carrier set of an element x ∈ X , a natural modification of a support set to
the present context. For xi ∈ Xi let
carri(xi) := spt(Ti(xi)) ⊆ Yi;
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i.e., carri(xi) is the set of pure strategies in Yi that receive positive weight
under the (conventional) mixed strategy Ti(xi) ∈ ∆i. For x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈
X let carr(x) := carr1(x1) ∪ · · · ∪ carrN (xN).
Let C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CN , where for each i = 1, . . . , N , Ci is a nonempty
subset of Yi. We say that C is the carrier for x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X if
Ci = carri(xi) for i = 1, . . . , N (or equivalently, if C = carr(x)).
As discussed in Section 2.2, a game is uniquely defined by a vector u ∈
RNK (which we refer to as the utility coefficient vector) specifying the pure-
strategy utility received by each player. The vector u uniquely defines the
expected utility Ui for each player i.
Given a strategy x ∈ X and vector of utility coefficients u ∈ RNK , let
F˜ ki (x, u) := T
1
i (xi)x
k
i [Ui(y
k+1
i , x−i)− Ui(y
1
i , x−i)] (9)
for i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , Ki − 1, and let
F˜ (x, u) :=
(
F˜ ki (x, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=1,...,Ki−1
. (10)
Definition 12 (Regular Equilibrium). Let x∗ ∈ X be an equilibrium of a
game with utility coefficient vector u. Assume the action set Yi of each player
is reordered so that y1i ∈ carri(x
∗
i ). The equilibrium x
∗ is said to be regular
if the Jacobian of F˜ (x∗, u), given by DxF˜ (x
∗, u), is non-singular.
Remark 13. We note that if x∗ is regular, then the Jacobian of F˜ (x∗, u) can
be shown to be nonsingular under any reordering of Yi in which the reference
action satisfies y1i ∈ carri(x
∗
i ) for all i = 1, . . . , N (see [43], Theorem 3.8).
This justifies the use of an arbitrary reference action y1i ∈ carri(x
∗
i ) in the
above definition.
Remark 14. The notion of a regular equilibrium is traditionally defined by
considering strategies in the space ∆ rather than X [4]. Using the definition
of F˜ ki and the properties of the determinant of a matrix, one may confirm that
the definition of regularity given in Definition 12 coincides with the traditional
definition in [4]. For completeness, a proof of the equivalency of Definition
12 with the traditional definition of regularity is included in Appendix A.
4. Regular Equilibria in Potential Games
In general games, the definition of a regular equilibrium relies on the in-
vertibility of the Jacobian of a particular map. In potential games, regular
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equilibria have a more natural interpretation. Roughly speaking, in a po-
tential game, an equilibrium is regular if it is a non-degenerate critical point
of the potential function. To be more precise, if an equilibrium x∗ lies in
the interior of the strategy space X then x∗ is a regular equilibrium if and
only if x∗ is a non-degenerate critical point of the potential function U (i.e.,
the Hessian of U is invertible at x∗) . If, on the other hand, x∗ lies on the
boundary of X , then the situation is slightly more delicate—one must also
account for behavior of the gradient of U at x∗.
In this section we will formalize this by introducing a pair of simple
conditions on the potential function that are equivalent to regularity within
the class of potential games. The first condition (referred to as the first-
order condition) concerns the gradient of the potential function; the second
condition (referred to as the second-order condition) concerns the Hessian of
the potential function.
In order to simplify the presentation, we begin by considering only games
with identical payoffs. In Sections 4.1–4.2 we define the notions of first and
second-order degeneracy in these games. In Section 4.3 we will see that,
in a game with identical payoffs, an equilibrium is regular if and only if it
satisfies these non-degeneracy conditions (see Lemma 22). In Section 4.4 we
generalize this characterization to potential games.
The conditions given in this section operate directly on the potential
function U , have an intuitive meaning, and (in our view) are simpler to work
with than Definition 12. Thus, we will generally prefer to work with these
conditions rather than Definition 12 through the remainder of the paper .
4.1. First-Order Degeneracy
Let C = C1∪· · ·∪CN , Ci ⊂ Yi ∀i = 1, . . . , N be some carrier set. Let γi :=
|Ci| and assume that the strategy set Yi is reordered so that {y
1
i , . . . , y
γi
i } =
Ci. Under this ordering, the first γi − 1 components of any strategy xi with
carri(xi) = Ci are free (not constrained to zero by Ci) and the remaining
components of xi are constrained to zero. That is (x
k
i )
γi−1
k=1 is free under Ci
and (xki )
Ki
k=γi
= 0. The set of strategies {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} is precisely
the interior of the face of X given by
ΩC := {x ∈ X : x
k
i = 0, k = γi, . . . , Ki − 1, i = 1, . . . , N}. (11)
Definition 15 (First-Order Degenerate Equilibrium). Suppose Γ is a game
with identical payoffs. Suppose x∗ ∈ X is an equilibrium of Γ with carrier C.
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We say that x∗ is a first-order degenerate equilibrium if there exists a pair
(i, k), i = 1, . . . , N , k = γi, . . . , Ki − 1 such that
∂U(x∗)
∂xki
= 0 (12)
and we say x∗ is first-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Definition 16 (First-order Degenerate Game). We say a game is first-order
degenerate if it has an equilibrium that is first-order degenerate, and we say
the game is first-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Example 17. The 2 × 2 identical-payoffs game with payoff matrix M =(
0 0
1 −1
)
has a first-order degenerate equilibrium at the strategy in which the
row player plays his second action with probability 1 and the column player
mixes between both his actions with equal probability.
Remark 18. Using the multi-linearity of U , it is straightforward to verify
that an equilibrium x∗ with carrier C is first order non-degenerate if and only
if, for every player i, the set of pure-strategy best responses to x∗−i coincides
with Ci. We note that, using this later definition, Harsanyi [3] referred to
first-order non-degenerate equilibria as quasi-strong equilibria. We prefer to
use the term first-order non-degenerate in order to emphasize that we are
concerned with the gradient of the potential function and to keep the nomen-
clature consistent with the notion of second-order non-degeneracy, introduced
next.
4.2. Second-Order Degeneracy
Let Γ be a game with identical payoffs. Let C be some carrier set. Let
N˜ := |{i = 1, . . . , N : γi ≥ 2}|, and assume that the player set is ordered
so that γi ≥ 2 for i = 1, . . . , N˜ . Under this ordering, for strategies with
carr(x) = C, the first N˜ players use mixed strategies and the remaining
players use pure strategies. Assume that N˜ ≥ 1 so that any x with carrier
C is a mixed (not pure) strategy.
Let the Hessian of U taken with respect to C be given by
H˜(x) :=
(
∂2U(x)
∂xki ∂x
ℓ
j
)
i,j=1,...,N˜,
k=1,...,γi−1,
ℓ=1,...,γj−1
. (13)
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Note that this definition of the Hessian restricts attention to the components
of x that are free (i.e., unconstrained) under C. That is, H˜(x) taken with
respect to C is the Hessian of U |ΩC at x.
Definition 19 (Second-Order Degenerate Equilibrium). Let Γ be a game
with identical payoffs. We say an equilibrium x∗ ∈ X is second-order degen-
erate if the Hessian H˜(x∗) taken with respect to carr(x∗) is singular, and we
say x∗ is second-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Definition 20 (Second-Order Degenerate Game). We say a game is second-
order degenerate if it has an equilibrium that is second-order degenerate, and
we say the game is second-order non-degenerate otherwise.
Remark 21. Note that both forms of degeneracy are concerned with the in-
teraction of the utility function (or more generally, the potential function—
see Section 4.4) and the “face” of the strategy space containing the equilibrium
x∗. If x∗ touches one or more constraints, then first-order non-degeneracy
ensures that the gradient of the potential function is nonzero normal to the
face Ωcarr(x∗), defined in (11). Second-order non-degeneracy ensures that, re-
stricting U to the face Ωcarr(x∗), the Hessian of U
∣∣
Ωcarr(x∗)
is non-singular.
If x∗ is contained within the interior of X, then the first-order condition be-
comes moot and the second-order condition reduces to the standard definition
of a non-degenerate critical point.
4.3. Regular Equilibria in Games with Identical Payoffs
The following lemma shows that the first and second-order non-degeneracy
conditions defined above are equivalent to regularity.
Lemma 22. Let Γ be a game with identical payoffs. Then,
(i) If an equilibrium x∗ is first-order non-degenerate, then it is second-order
non-degenerate if and only if it is regular.
(ii) If an equilibrium x∗ is regular, then it is first-order non-degenerate.
In particular, an equilibrium x∗ is regular if and only if it is both first and
second-order non-degenerate.
The proof of this lemma follows readily from the definitions of regularity
and first and second-order degeneracy. A proof of the lemma can be found
in Appendix B.
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4.4. Regular Equilibria in Potential Games
We now generalize the characterization of regular equilibria from identical-
payoff games to potential games.
Given a potential game with potential function U , we define the “asso-
ciated identical-payoffs game” to be the identical-payoffs game in which the
utility of each player is given by Ui = U . The following lemma establishes
the fundamental relationship between general (weighted) potential games
and identical-payoff games.
Lemma 23. Suppose Γ is a potential game with potential function U . An
equilibrium x∗ of Γ is regular if and only if x∗ is a regular equilibrium of the
associated identical-payoffs game.
We remark that since Γ and the associated identical payoffs game are
best-response equivalent in mixed strategies (see (5)), their equilibrium sets
coincide. Thus, when applying the above lemma one need not verify that x∗
is an equilibrium in the associated game. We now prove the lemma.
Proof. Let u ∈ RNK be the utility coefficient vector representing the game
Γ and let u¯ ∈ RNK be the utility coefficient vector representing the identical
payoffs game where all player use the potential function as their utility.
Differentiating (7), using Definition 5 and the definitions of expected
utility and potential (2) and (6) we see that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N},
k ∈ {1, . . . , Ki − 1}, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , Kj − 1} we have
∂Ui(x)
∂xki ∂x
ℓ
j
= wi
∂U(x)
∂xki ∂x
ℓ
j
. Hence,
for each i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . , Ki, the (i, k)-th row of DxF˜ (x, u) is equal
to the (i, k)-th row of DxF˜ (x, u¯) times the constant wi > 0. By elemen-
tary properties of the determinant, this implies that detDxF˜ (x, u) = 0 ⇐⇒
detDxF˜ (x, u¯) = 0. By Definition 12 this implies the desired result.
The practical implication of this result (combined with Lemma 22) is that
if x∗ is an equilibrium of a potential game Γ with potential function U , then
x∗ is a regular equilibrium of Γ if and only if x∗ satisfies the first and second-
order non-degeneracy conditions for the associated identical payoffs game.
In particular, if x∗ lies in the interior of X , then x∗ is a regular equilibrium
of Γ if and only if it is a non-degenerate critical point of U (i.e., satisfies the
second-order non-degeneracy condition). If x∗ is on the boundary of X , then
we must also account for the first-order non-degeneracy condition.
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5. Regularity in Games with Identical Payoffs
In this section we prove that almost all games with identical payoffs are
regular; i.e., we prove Proposition 3.
Our strategy for proving the proposition is as follows. First, we note
that by Proposition 11 we see that the set identical-payoff games that are
irregular is a closed subset of I. Thus, it is sufficient to prove that the set
of irregular identical-payoff games has LK-measure zero. Given this fact,
we will prove Proposition 3 in two steps. We begin by showing that almost
all games with identical payoffs are second-order non-degenerate (Section
5.1 and Proposition 24). Subsequently we show that almost all games with
identical payoffs are first-order non-degenerate (Section 5.2 and Proposition
30). Since a game is regular if and only if it is first and second-order non-
degenerate (Lemma 22) Propositions 24 and 30 together prove Proposition
3.
5.1. Second-Order Degenerate Games
Throughout the section, we will assume the number of players N and
number of actions Ki, i = 1, . . . , N is fixed, and let K be as defined in (1)
(cf. (8)). The goal of this subsection is to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 24. The set of identical-payoff games which are second-order
degenerate has LK-measure zero.
We will prove the proposition using Sard’s theorem. Our construction
roughly follows that of [3]. We begin by introducing some pertinent notation
and preliminary results.
Note that the set of joint pure strategies Y may be expressed as an ordered
set Y = {y1, . . . , yK} where each yτ ∈ Y , is an N -tuple of strategies, τ ∈
{1, . . . , K}. We will assume a particular ordering for this set after Proposition
25.
In an identical-payoffs game there exists a single function u : Y → R
such that ui = u for all i = 1, . . . , N . If we consider the vector of utility
coefficients u = (u(y))y∈Y ∈ R
K as a variable, then by (4), U is linear in u.7
At this point we will express U in a more convenient form.
7The potential function U is, of course, a function of both x and u. However, since we
will only exploit the dependence on u in this section, we generally stick to the standard
game-theoretic convention of writing U as a function of x only [44].
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Let τ = 1, . . . , K, i = 1, . . . , N and xi ∈ Xi. We define q
τ
i : Xi → [0, 1]
by
qτi (xi) := T
k
i (xi) (14)
where k corresponds to the action played by player i in the tuple yτ , i.e,
(yτ)i = y
k
i , and where T
k
i (xi) is the k-th component of Ti(xi). In an abuse of
notation, given a pure strategy yki ∈ Yi, we let q
τ
i (y
k
i ) = 1 if (y
τ)i = y
k
i and
qτi (y
k
i ) = 0 otherwise.
Given a fixed vector of utility coefficients u ∈ RK , the utility function
U : X → R may be expressed as (see (4) and (14))
U(x) =
K∑
τ=1
uτ
[
N∏
i=1
qτi (xi)
]
. (15)
Note that this form makes it clear that U is linear in u.
Now, let C = C1∪· · ·∪CN be some carrier set. The analysis through the
remainder of the section will rely on this carrier set being fixed, and many of
the subsequent terms are implicitly dependent on the choice of C. In keeping
with our prior convention we let γi := |Ci|, and let N˜ := |{i ∈ {1, . . . , N} :
γi ≥ 2}|.
Any xi with carrier Ci has precisely γi − 1 free components (i.e., not
constrained to zero by Ci). The joint strategy x = (x1, . . . , xN) is a vector
with
γ :=
N∑
i=1
(γi − 1)
free components.
By (7) we have that
∂U(x)
∂xki
= U(yk+1i , x−i)− U(y
1
i , x−i) =: F
k
i (x, u) (16)
for i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1. Let
F (x, u) :=
(
F ki (x, u)
)
i=1,...,N˜
k=1,...,γi−1
. (17)
Given an x ∈ X , it is at times useful to decompose it as x = (xp, xm), where
xm = (x
k
i )i=1,...,N˜, k=1,...,γi−1 and xp contains the remaining components of x.
(The subscript of xm is indicative of “mixed strategy components” of x and
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xp indicative of “pure strategy components” of x.) In this decomposition,
xm is a γ-dimensional vector containing the free components of x. Taking
the Jacobian of F in terms of the components of xm we find that
DxmF (xp, xm, u) = H˜(x), (18)
where DxmF (xp, xm, u) =
(
∂F
∂xℓi
)
i=1,...,N˜,
ℓ=1,...,γi−1
.
Let x∗ be a mixed equilibrium with carrier C. Differentiating (7) we
see that at the equilibrium x∗ we have ∂U(x
∗)
∂xki
= 0 for i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k =
1, . . . , γi − 1 (see Lemma 35 in appendix), or equivalently,
F ki (x
∗, u) = U(yk+1i , x
∗
−i)− U(y
1
i , x
∗
−i) = 0 (19)
for i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1. Using (15) in the above we get
F ki (x
∗, u) =
K∑
τ=1
uτ
[(
qτi (y
k+1
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i )
)∏
j 6=i
qτj (x
∗
j )
]
= 0. (20)
It will be convenient to be able to relate the ordering of Y with the
ordering of (F ki )i=1,...,N˜ , k=1,...,γi−1. For this purpose, given i = 1, . . . , N˜ ,
k = 1, . . . , γi − 1, let
s∗(i, k) :=
{
k for i = 1,∑i−1
j=1(γj − 1) + k for i ≥ 2.
Define i∗ : {1, . . . , γ} → {1, . . . , N˜} and k∗ : {1, . . . , γ} → {1, . . . ,maxi{γi −
1}} to be the inverse of s∗; that is
s∗(i∗(s), k∗(s)) = s (21)
for all s = 1, . . . , γ.
Given an x ∈ X , let A(x) = (as,τ(x))s=1,...,γ,
τ=1,...,K
∈ Rγ×K be defined as the
matrix with entries
as,τ (x) :=
(
qτi∗(s)(y
k∗(s)+1
i )− q
τ
i∗(s)(y
1
i )
) ∏
j 6=i∗(s)
qτj (xj), (22)
Using this notation, (20) is equivalently expressed as
A(x∗)u = 0. (23)
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The following proposition establishes the solvability of (23). We note
that, in order to prove Proposition 24 (the main result of this section), it is
sufficient to consider only x such that carr(x) = C in the following proposi-
tion. However, later, when studying first order degenerate games in Section
5.2, we will consider the notion of an “extended carrier set” (see (34)), and
we will need to characterize the rank of A(x) for x with carr(x) ⊂ C.
Proposition 25. For any x such that carr(x) ⊆ C, the matrix A(x) has full
row rank.
Before proving this proposition we introduce some notation that will per-
mit us to study the structure of A(x).
We begin by establishing a particular ordering of elements in Y . Let
K˜ :=
N∏
i=1
γi.
For τ = 1, . . . , K˜, let ατ = (α
1
τ , . . . , α
N˜
τ ) be a multi-index associated with the
τ -th action tuple in Y , meaning that
yτ = (y
α1τ
1 , . . . , y
αN˜τ
N˜
, y1
N˜+1
, . . . , y1N),
where y1i , for i = N˜ + 1, . . . , N , is, by construction, the pure strategy used
by player i at any strategy x with carrier C. Let Y be reordered so that for
every τ = 1, . . . , K˜, i = 1, . . . , N˜ we have 1 ≤ αiτ ≤ γi. This ensures that
the first K˜ strategies in Y contain all strategy combinations of the elements
of C1, . . . , CN , and that for any multi-index α = (α
1, . . . , αN˜), 1 ≤ αi ≤ γi,
there exists a unique 1 ≤ τ ≤ K˜ such that yτ = (yα
1
1 , . . . , y
αN˜
N˜
, y1
N˜+1
, . . . , y1N).
By definition (14) and the ordering we assumed for Y we have that
qτi (y
k
i ) =
{
1 if k = αiτ
0 otherwise.
(24)
For 1 ≤ s ≤ γ and 1 ≤ τ ≤ K˜, let
rs,τ := q
τ
i (y
k+1
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i ) and ps,τ(x) :=
∏
j 6=i
qτj (xj), (25)
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where i = i∗(s) and k = k∗(s) (see (21)), and note that as,τ(x) = rs,τps,τ(x)
(see (22)). We may writeA(x) = R◦P(x), where ◦ is the Hadamard product,
and R and P(x) have entries rs,τ and ps,τ (x) respectively.
Partition A(x), R and P(x) as A(x) = [A1(x) A2(x)], R = [R1 R2], and
P(x) = [P1(x)P2(x)], whereA1(x),R1,P1(x) ∈ R
γ×K˜ andA2(x),R2,P2(x) ∈
Rγ×(K−K˜), so we may write
A(x) = [A1(x)A2(x)], with, A1(x) = R1◦P1(x) and A2(x) = R2◦P2(x).
In order to show that A(x) has full row rank, it is sufficient to prove that
A1(x) has full row rank—this is the approach we will take in proving the
proposition.
We address this by studying the sign pattern of A1(x). Properties of
sign pattern matrices (i.e., matrices with entries in {−1, 0, 1}) have been
well-studied [45, 41]. We recall the following definition from [45],
Definition 26. A sign pattern matrix L ∈ Rm×n with n ≥ m is said to be
an L-matrix if for every matrix M with sgn(M) = sgn(L), the matrix M has
full row rank.
The following lemma characterizes L-matrices [45, 41].
Lemma 27. Let L ∈ Rm×n be a sign pattern matrix with n ≥ m. Then L is
an L-matrix if and only if for every diagonal sign pattern matrix D ∈ Rm×m,
D 6= 0 there is a nonzero column of DL in which each nonzero entry has the
same sign.
In light of Definition 26, Proposition 25 is equivalent to the following
lemma.
Lemma 28. For any x such that carr(x) ⊆ C, the matrix A1(x) =
(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) is an L-matrix.
The proof of this lemma relies on showing that (R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) satis-
fies the L-matrix characterization given in Lemma 27. While this lemma is
critical to the proof of Proposition 3, the proof of the lemma requires one
to check several special cases and can be somewhat tedious. Readers may
which to skip the proof this lemma on a first read through.
Before proving Lemma 28 we introduce some definitions that will be useful
in the proof.
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Given a diagonal matrix D ∈ Rℓ×ℓ, ℓ ∈ N, let diag (D) be the vector in
Rℓ containing the diagonal elements of D.
Given a diagonal sign pattern matrix D ∈ Rℓ×ℓ, ℓ ∈ N, define idx(D)
as follows. If diag (D) does not contain any ones, then let idx(D) = 1.
Otherwise, let idx(D) be one more than the first index in diag (D) containing
a 1.89
Given a diagonal matrix D ∈ Rγ×γ, let Di ∈ R
(γi−1)×(γi−1), i = 1, . . . , N˜
be the (unique) diagonal matrices satisfying
diag (D) = (diag (D1), . . . , diag (DN)).
We now prove Lemma 28.
Proof. Let x be a strategy satisfying carr(x) ⊆ C. In order to show that
(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) is an L-matrix, it is sufficient (by Lemma 27) to show that
and for any diagonal sign pattern matrix D 6= 0, there exists a column of
D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) which is nonzero and in which every nonzero entry has
the same sign. With this in mind, we begin by giving a characterization of
the columns of R1.
Suppose that i = 1, . . . , N˜ and k = 1, . . . , γi − 1 are fixed. Note the
following:
(i) Suppose τ ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} is such that αiτ = k + 1, where α
i
τ is the i-th
index of the multi-index ατ . Since ατ is used to define the ordering
of actions in Y , we have qτi (y
k+1
i ) = 1 and q
τ
i (y
1
i ) = 0 (see (24) and
preceding discussion). Hence, qτi (y
k+1
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i ) = 1.
(ii) Suppose τ ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} is such that αiτ = 1. Then q
τ
i (y
k+1
i ) = 0, and
qτi (y
1
i ) = 1. Hence, q
τ
i (y
k+1
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i ) = −1.
(iii) For all other τ ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} we have qτi (y
k+1
i ) = 0, and q
τ
i (y
1
i ) = 0, and
hence qτi (y
k+1
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i ) = 0.
8Assume indexing starts with one, not zero. For example, if the first time a 1 appears
in diag (D) is at index 2, then idx(D) = 3.
9The awkward offset in this definition is needed in order to handle the indexing offset
inherent in the mapping Ti : Xi → ∆i, i = 1, . . . , N .
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For 1 ≤ τ ≤ K˜, let rτ ∈ R
γ be the τ -th column of R1. Partition this
column as
rτ =
r
1
τ
...
rN˜τ
 .
where riτ ∈ R
γi−1. From (25) we see that
riτ =
 q
τ
i (y
2
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i )
...
qτi (y
γi
i )− q
τ
i (y
1
i )
 .
Given the observations (i)–(iii) above we see that for each i we have
riτ =
{
−1 if αiτ = 1
eαiτ−1 if 2 ≤ α
i
τ ≤ γi,
(26)
where the symbol eαiτ−1 refers to the (α
i
τ − 1)-th canonical vector in R
γi−1
and 1 ∈ Rγi−1 is the vector of all ones.
We now characterize the columns of sgn(P1(x)). For i = 1, . . . , N˜ we
define
idxi(x) :=
{
k ∈ {1, . . . , γi} : T
k
i (xi) > 0
}
.
Since carr(x) = C, the ordering we assumed for Yi implies that T
k
i (x) = 0
for k ≥ γi + 1. By the definition of Ti, it is not possible to have T
k
i (xi) = 0
for all k = 1, . . . , Ki and hence idxi(x) 6= ∅.
Let pτ be the τ -th column of P1(x) and let
p˜τ := sgn(pτ )
be the τ -th column of sgn(P1(x)).
10 Suppose that τ ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} is such
that for the multi-index ατ we have α
i
τ ∈ idxi(x) for all i = 1, . . . , N˜ . Then
for each s = 1, . . . , γ the (s, τ)-th entry of P1(x) is strictly positive (see (14)
and (25)), and hence pτ is positive and p˜τ = 1.
10For convenience in notation, we suppress the argument x when writing the columns
of these matrices.
25
Partition the columns pτ and p˜τ as
pτ =
p
1
τ
...
pN˜τ
 and p˜τ =
 p˜
1
τ
...
p˜N˜τ
 , (27)
where piτ , p˜
i
τ ∈ R
γi−1. Suppose that τ is such that for the multi-index ατ
we have αiτ /∈ idxi(x) for exactly one subindex i ∈ {1, . . . , N˜}. Then p
i
τ is
positive (see (25)) and pjτ is zero for any j 6= i. Hence, p˜
i
τ = 1 and p˜
j
τ = 0
for any j 6= i.
Now, let D ∈ Rγ×γ be an non-zero diagonal sign pattern matrix. We will
show that there is a nonzero column of D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) in which each
nonzero entry is a 1.
We now consider two possible cases for the structure of D and show that
in each case there is a nonzero column of D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) in which every
nonzero entry is 1.
Case 1: Suppose that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N˜} such that idx(Di) /∈ idxi(x)
we have diag (Di) = 0. Choose τ such that{
αiτ = idx(Di) if idx(Di) ∈ idxi(x),
αiτ ∈ idxi(x) if idx(Di) /∈ idxi(x).
Note that αiτ ∈ idxi(x) for all i = 1, . . . , N˜ , and hence p˜τ = 1 (see discussion
preceding (27)). The τ -th column of D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) is given by
D(rτ ◦ p˜τ ) = diag (D) ◦ rτ =
(
diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ
)N˜
i=1
. (28)
For any i such that idx(Di) /∈ idxi(x) we have, by assumption, diag (Di) =
0 and hence diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ = 0. Moreover, note that in this case we have
idx(Di) = 1 since, by the definition of idx(·), diag (Di) = 0 implies idx(Di) =
1.
Suppose now that i is such that idx(Di) ∈ idxi(x). For i = 1, . . . , N˜ ,
if αiτ = 1 then r
i
τ = −1 (by (26)) and diag (Di) contains no ones (this is
the definition of idx(Di) = 1). In fact, diag (Di) contains only entries with
value of 0 or −1. Hence, diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ = −diag (Di), which is a nonnegative
vector.
If 2 ≤ αiτ ≤ γi then r
i
τ = eαiτ−1 (by (26)). Recalling the definition of
idx(·), by our choice of αiτ = idx(Di), the (α
i
τ − 1)-th entry of diag (Di) is 1.
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Hence, diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ = eαiτ−1. In particular, this implies that if α
i
τ 6= 1 then
diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ is not identically zero and every nonzero entry of diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ
is 1.
In summary, for i = 1, . . . , N˜ , we have diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ ≥ 0, with equality
only when idx(Di) = 1 and Di = 0. Hence, by (28), the τ -th column
of D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) satisfies D(rτ ◦ p˜τ ) ≥ 0, with equality only when
idx(Di) = 1 and Di = 0 for all i. But, by assumption D 6= 0, so D(rτ ◦ p˜τ ) 6=
0.
Case 2: Suppose that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N˜} we have idx(Di) 6∈ idxi(x)
and diag (Di) 6= 0. Let τ ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} be chosen such that α
i
τ = idx(Di) for
exactly one such i ∈ {1, . . . , N˜} and for all other j 6= i we have αiτ ∈ idxj
(this is always possible since idxj 6= ∅). Then we have
p˜iτ = 1, and p˜
j
τ = 0, for all j 6= i
(see discussion following (27)).
As shown in Case 1, if αiτ = 1, then Di ≤ 0 and r
i
τ = −1 which implies
that diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ ≥ 0. Moreover, since p˜
i
τ = 1 and since, by assumption
diag (Di) 6= 0 we have diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ ◦ p˜
i
τ 6= 0 and every nonzero entry is 1.
If 2 ≤ αiτ ≤ γi, then, again using the same reasoning as in Case 1, we see
that diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ = eαiτ−1. Since p˜
i
τ = 1 we get that diag (Di) ◦ r
i
τ ◦ p
i
τ =
eαiτ−1.
For j 6= i we have p˜jτ = 0, which implies diag (Dj) ◦ r
j
τ ◦ p˜
j
τ = 0.
All together, this implies that the τ -th column of D(R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))),
given by (diag (Dj) ◦ r
j
τ ◦ p˜
j
τ )
N˜
j=1, is nonzero and every nonzero entry is equal
to 1.
Since this holds for arbitrary diagonal sign matrix D 6= 0, Lemma 27
implies that (R1 ◦ sgn(P1(x))) is an L-matrix. Since this holds for any x
satisfying carr(x) ⊆ C, we see that the desired result holds.
Given the carrier C there are
(
K
γ
)
possible combinations (of length γ) of
the columns of A(x). For each r = 1, . . . ,
(
K
γ
)
, let Ar(x) ∈ R
γ×γ denote a
square matrix formed by taking one unique combination of the columns of
A(x). For r = 1, . . . ,
(
K
γ
)
, let
Sr := {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C, detAr(x) 6= 0}.
By Proposition 25, no strategy x ∈ X with carr(x) = C may simulta-
neously be in all Scr . Note also that each Sr is open relative to the set
27
{x ∈ X : carr(x) = C} = Ω˚C (see (11)). Thus, we may construct a count-
able family of open balls (Bℓ)ℓ≥1, Bℓ ⊂ ΩC that satisfy:
(i)
⋃
ℓ≥1Bℓ = {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C}
(ii) For each ℓ ∈ N there exists an rℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,
(
K
γ
)
} such that Bℓ ⊆ Srℓ (i.e.,
Arℓ(x) is invertible for all x ∈ Bℓ).
Fix ℓ ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. After reordering, A(x) may be partitioned as A(x) =
[A˜rℓ(x) Arℓ(x)], where A˜rℓ(x) is a matrix formed by the columns of A(x)
not used to form Arℓ(x). Let the strategy set Y be reordered in the same
way as the columns A(x).11 Given a vector of utility coefficients u ∈ RK ,
let it be partitioned as u = (u1, u2), where u1 = (u
1, . . . , uK−γ) and u2 =
(uK−γ+1, . . . , uK). Define ρ˜ℓ : Bℓ × R
K−γ → Rγ by
ρ˜ℓ(x, u1) := −Arℓ(x)
−1A˜rℓ(x)u1, (29)
If x∗ ∈ Bℓ is an equilibrium for some identical-payoffs game with utility
coefficient vector u, then by (23) we have A(x∗)u = 0. Since Arℓ(x
∗) is
invertible, this is equivalent to u2 = −Arℓ(x
∗)−1A˜rℓ(x
∗)u1. Hence, if x
∗ ∈ Bℓ
is an equilibrium of some identical-payoffs game with utility coefficient vector
u = (u1, u2), the function ρ˜ℓ permits us to recover u2 given u1 and x
∗.
Conversely, suppose x ∈ Bℓ and u1 ∈ R
K−γ are arbitrary. If u = (u1, u2)
with u2 = ρ˜ℓ(x, u1), then by the definition of ρ˜ℓ we see that A(x)u = 0. By
the definition of A(x) (see (17)–(22)) this implies
F (x, u1, ρ˜ℓ(x, u1)) = 0, for all x ∈ Bℓ.
Thus, taking a partial derivative with respect to xki we get
∂
∂xki
F (x, u1, ρ˜ℓ(x, u1)) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1. (30)
Consider again the decomposition x = (xp, xm). Using compact notation,
(30) is restated as
DxmF (xp, xm, u1, ρ˜ℓ(xp, xm, u1)) = 0. (31)
Suppose x∗ ∈ Bℓ is an equilibrium of a identical-payoffs game with utility
coefficient vector u and carr(x∗) = C. Applying the chain rule in (31), using
11Note that we previously assumed a specific ordering for Y . However, this was for the
purpose of proving Proposition 25, which is unaffected by a reordering of Y at this point.
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(18), and using the fact that F (x, u) = A(x)u = A˜rℓ(x)u1 + Arℓ(x)u2, we
find that at x∗ there holds12
H˜(x∗) = −Arℓ(x
∗)J˜ρℓ(x
∗, u), (32)
where J˜ρℓ(x, u) := Dx˜m ρ˜ℓ(xp, x˜m, u)
∣∣
x˜m=xm
is the Jacobian of ρ˜ℓ taken with
respect to xm.
Since Arℓ(x) is invertible for all x ∈ Bℓ, this means that given any equi-
librium x∗ ∈ Bℓ, the Hessian H˜(x
∗) is nonsingular if and only if the Jacobian
J˜ρℓ(x
∗, u) is nonsingular.
For each ℓ ∈ N, define the function ρℓ : Bℓ × R
K−γ → RK by ρℓ(x, u1) :=
(u1, ρ˜ℓ(x, u1)). The function ρℓ is a trivial extension of ρ˜ℓ that recovers the
full vector of utility coefficients u ∈ RK given u1 ∈ R
K−γ and an equilibrium
x∗ ∈ Bℓ.
Remark 29. In the case of general N-player games, as considered in [3, 4],
Harsanyi (and van Damme) construct a mapping into RNK (denoted by the
symbol ρ∗∗ in [3]) which recovers the individual utility coefficients for each
player, given a subset of NK−γ utility coefficients and an equilibrium strat-
egy. In that case, the equality governing the relationship between strategies
and utility coefficients is given by an equation analogous to (23) (see (49)
in [3]) in which the matrix corresponding to A(x) in (23) has dimension
γ × NK. Effectively, Harsanyi’s mapping ρ∗∗ is constructed by choosing γ
columns of the associated matrix A(x) that are linearly independent for all
x ∈ X, and inverting this square submatrix as in (29). Sard’s theorem then
gives that the critical values set of this map has LNK-measure zero. In order
to prove genericity results for identical-payoff games we must show that the
set of irregular identical-payoff games has LK-measure zero. One can re-
strict Harsanyi’s map to the set of identical-payoff games I = RK. However,
if Harsanyi’s map is restricted to the set of identical-payoff games (which
reduces the dimension of the input vector of utility coefficients from NK − γ
to K − γ), the mapping looses uniqueness for some values of x. Instead, one
must construct a collection of (well-defined) mappings (ρℓ)ℓ, each of which
recovers the full vector of utility coefficients given a vector of K−γ utility co-
efficients and an equilibrium strategy x∗ ∈ Bℓ ⊂ X, where Bℓ is some subset
12We note that H˜(x∗) is also dependent on u. However, we suppress the argument u
since it is generally held constant in the context of the Hessian H˜.
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of X where the mapping ρℓ is well defined. This is accomplished by showing
that the matrix A(x) in (23) has full row rank and constructing each ρℓ as
an appropriate combination of the columns of A(x).
Note that the Jacobian of ρℓ takes the form
Jρℓ(x, u) =
(
0 I
Jρ˜ℓ M
)
,
for some matrix M. Clearly, det Jρℓ = 0 if and only if det J˜ρℓ = 0. Thus,
by (32) we see that if x∗ ∈ Bℓ is an equilibrium of an identical-payoffs game
with utility coefficient vector u, then
detJρℓ(x
∗, u) = 0 ⇐⇒ det H˜(x∗) = 0. (33)
We now prove Proposition 24.
Proof. Let C be a carrier set. Let U(C) ⊆ RK be the set of identical-payoff
games having at least one degenerate equilibrium with carrier set C; that is,
U(C) :=
{
u ∈ RK : ∃ degenerate equilibrium x∗ ∈ {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C}
}
.
For ℓ ∈ N, let U(C, ℓ) ⊆ RK be the subset of identical-payoff games
having at least one degenerate equilibrium x∗ ∈ Bℓ, where Bℓ is defined with
respect to C; that is,
U(C, ℓ) :=
{
u ∈ RK : ∃ degenerate equilibrium x∗ ∈ Bℓ
}
.
By construction, we have
⋃
ℓ≥1Bℓ = {x ∈ X : carr(x) = C}, and hence
U(C) =
⋃
ℓ≥1 U(C, ℓ).
We showed above that for any (x, u) ∈ Bℓ × R
K such that x is an equi-
librium of the identical-payoffs game with utility coefficients u, the Hessian
H˜(x) (taken with respect to C) is invertible if and only if the Jacobian of
ρℓ(x, u) is invertible. Thus, the set U(C, ℓ) is contained in the set of critical
values of ρℓ. By Sard’s theorem, we get that U(C, ℓ) is a set with L
K-measure
zero. Since U(C) is the countable union of sets of LK-measure zero, it is itself
a set with LK-measure zero.
Let U ⊂ RK denote the subset of identical-payoff games with at least
one degenerate equilibrium. The set U may be expressed as the union U =⋃
C U(C) taken over all possible support sets C. Since there are a finite
number of support sets C, the set U has LK-measure zero.
30
5.2. First-Order Degenerate Games
The following proposition shows that, within the set of identical-payoff
games, first-order degenerate games form a null set.
Proposition 30. The set of identical-payoff games which are first-order de-
generate has LK-measure zero.
Proof. Fix some set C = C1∪· · ·∪CN where each Ci is a nonempty subset of
Yi. Let Ĉ be any strict subset of C. In the context of this proof let γi := |Ci|,
let γ :=
∑N
i=1(γi − 1), let N˜ := |{i = 1, . . . , N : γi ≥ 2}|, and assume Yi is
reordered so that {y1i , . . . , y
γi
i } = Ci. Note that this ordering implies that for
any x with carr(x) = C we have y1i ∈ carr(x), i = 1, . . . , N .
Given an equilibrium x∗ let the extended carrier of x∗ be defined as
ext carr (x∗) := carr(x∗) ∪
(
N⋃
i=1
{yki ∈ Yi : k = 2, . . .Ki,
∂U(x∗)
∂xk−1i
= 0}
)
.
(34)
Suppose that x∗ is an equilibrium with extended carrier C. By Lemma 35
(see appendix) and the ordering we assumed for Yi we have
F ki (x
∗, u) =
∂U(x∗)
∂xk−1i
= 0, i = 1, . . . , N˜ , k = 1, . . . , γi − 1, (35)
where F ki is as defined in (16). Thus, if x
∗ is an equilibrium for some identical-
payoffs game with utility coefficient vector u ∈ RK , and ext carr (x∗) = C,
then by the definition of A(x) (see (17)–(22)), (35) implies that A(x∗)u = 0,
or equivalently,
u ∈ kerA(x∗),
where the matrix A(x) ∈ Rγ×K is defined with respect to C, as in (22).
Let U(C, Ĉ) ⊆ RK be the set of identical-payoff games in which there
exists an equilibrium x∗ with carr(x∗) = Ĉ and ext carr (x∗) = C. Let
X̂ := {x ∈ X : carr(x) = Ĉ}.
By the above we see that
U(C, Ĉ) ⊆ ∪x∈X̂ kerA(x). (36)
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For each x ∈ X̂ , let rangeA(x)T denote the range space of A(x)T . Each
entry of A(x)T is a polynomial function in x and hence is Lipschitz continu-
ous over the bounded set X̂ . By Proposition 25 we have rankA(x)T = γ for
all x ∈ X̂ . Thus, we may choose a set of γ basis vectors {b1(x), . . . ,bγ(x)}
spanning rangeA(x)T such that each bk(x) ∈ R
K , k = 1, . . . , γ is a Lips-
chitz continuous function in x. Moreover, we may choose a complementary
set of (K − γ) linearly independent vectors {bγ+1(x), . . . ,bK(x)} forming
a basis for the orthogonal complement (rangeA(x)T )⊥, with each bk(x) ∈
RK , k = γ + 1, . . . , K being a continuous function in x. Let B(x) :=
(bγ+1(x) · · · bK(x)) ∈ R
K×(K−γ). Let f : X̂ × RK−γ → RK be given by
f(x, v) := B(x)v. Since B(x) is Lipschitz continuous in x and X̂ is bounded,
f is Lipschitz continuous. By the fundamental theorem of linear algebra, for
each x ∈ X̂ , kerA(x) = (rangeA(x)T )⊥ = rangeB(x). Hence,⋃
x∈X̂
kerA(x) = f(X̂ × RK−γ). (37)
Since Ĉ ( C, the Hausdorff dimension of X̂ is at most (γ − 1) and the
Hausdorff dimension of X̂ × RK−γ is at most K − 1. Since f is Lipschitz
continuous, this implies (see [42], Section 2.4) that the Hausdorff dimension
of f(X̂×RK−γ) is at mostK−1, and in particular, that f(X̂×RK−γ) has LK-
measure zero. By (36) and (37), this implies that U(C, Ĉ) has LK-measure
zero.
Let U ⊆ RK denote the set of all identical-payoff games containing a
first-order degenerate equilibrium. Since we may represent this set as a finite
union of LK-measure zero sets,
U =
⋃
∅6=Ci⊆Yi, i=1,...,N
C=C1∪···∪CN
Ĉ(C
U(C, Ĉ),
the set U also has LK-measure zero.
6. Regularity in Exact and Weighted Potential Games
The goal of this section is to prove generic regularity in exact and weighted
potential games, as stated in the following proposition.
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Proposition 31.
(i) Almost all weighted potential games are regular.
(ii) Almost all exact potential games are regular.
Exact and weighted potential games are closely related to games with
identical payoffs. By identifying equivalence relationships between identical-
payoff games and exact and weighted potential games, this result follows as
a relatively simple consequence of Proposition 3.
Let the number of players N ≥ 2 and action-space size Ki ≥ 2, i =
1, . . . , N be arbitrary. Define
I˜ := {u ∈ I : 1Tu = 0},
where I = RK is the set of identical-payoff games as given in (8). The set I˜
will provide a convenient means of partitioning the sets of exact and weighted
potential games.
Note that an identical-payoffs game u ∈ I˜ is regular if and only if u˜ =
u + c1 is regular for every c ∈ R. Note also that I˜ is isomorphic to RK−1.
(Henceforth we will treat I˜ as I˜ = RK−1.) This, along with Proposition 3,
implies the following lemma.
Lemma 32. The set of games in I˜ that are irregular has LK−1-measure zero.
As defined in Section 2.2, let P ⊂ RNK denote the set of all exact potential
games and let W ⊂ RNK denote the set of all weighted potential games (of
size (N, (Ki)
N
i=1)). A element v ∈ P or v ∈ W is a vector in R
NK which we
decompose as v = (vi)
N
i=1 where vi ∈ R
K represent the pure-strategy utility
of player i. For each u ∈ I˜, define
Pu :=
{
v ∈ RNK : vi(yi, y−i)− vi(y
′
i, y−i) = u(yi, y−i)− u(y
′
i, y−i)
∀i = 1, . . . , N, yi, y
′
i ∈ Yi, y−i ∈ Y−i
}
;
to be the set of all potential games with potential function u ∈ I˜. Using
Definition 6 it is straightforward to verify that Pu∩Pu˜ = ∅ for every u, u˜ ∈ I˜,
u 6= u˜ and
⋃
u∈I˜ Pu = P. Thus (Pu)u∈I˜ partitions P. Likewise, define
Wu :=
{
v ∈ RNK : vi(yi, y−i)− vi(y
′
i, y−i) = wi(u(yi, y−i)− u(y
′
i, y−i))
∀i = 1, . . . , N, yi, y
′
i ∈ Yi, y−i ∈ Y−i, and for some wi > 0
}
to be set of all weighted potential games with potential function u ∈ I˜. As
in the case of exact potential games, we see that (Wu)u∈I˜ partitions W.
By Lemma 23 we get the following result.
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Lemma 33.
(i) For each u ∈ I˜ and each exact potential game v ∈ Pu, v is regular if and
only if u is regular.
(ii) For each u ∈ I˜ and each weighted potential game w ∈ Wu, w is regular
if and only if u is regular.
Recall that P and W are subspaces of RNK with dimensions Kp and
Kw, respectively (see Section 2.2). Since (Pu)u∈I˜ partitions P, every exact
potential game v ∈ P may be uniquely represented by a vector (u, z) where
u ∈ I˜ = RK−1 and z ∈ RK˜p, K˜p := Kp −K + 1. Likewise, every weighted
potential game v ∈ W may be uniquely represented by a vector (u, z) where
u ∈ I˜ = RK−1 and z ∈ RK˜w , K˜w := Kw −K + 1.
Let IRp ⊂ P and IRw ⊂ W denote the subsets of the exact and weighted
potential games (respectively) that are irregular. Recall that by Proposition
11, IRp and IRw are closed and hence measurable. Since L
K−1(I˜) = 0 we see
that LKp(IRp) = L
Kp
(
I˜ × RKp−K+1
)
= LK−1
(
I˜
)
LKp−K+1
(
RKp−K+1
)
= 0.
By similar reasoning we also see that LKw(IRw) = 0. Since IRp and IRw are
closed with respect to P andW (see Proposition 11), this proves Proposition
31.
Appendix A.
As noted in Remark 14, the notion of a regular equilibrium is traditionally
defined by considering strategies in the space ∆ rather than X. In this appendix
we verify that the definition of a regular equilibrium given in Definition 12 is
equivalent to the standard definition of a regular equilibrium given for strategies
in ∆ as in [4].
In an abuse of notation, given a strategy σ ∈ ∆ and a vector u ∈ RK , let
F˜ ki (σ, u) := F˜
k
i (T
−1(σ), u) (A.1)
for i = 1, . . . , N and k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1, where F˜
k
i (x, u) is as defined in (9). Fur-
thermore, let
F˜ 0i (σ, u) :=
(
Ki∑
k=1
σki
)
− 1 (A.2)
for i = 1, . . . , N , and let
F˜ (σ, u) := (F˜ ki (σ, u)) i=1,...,N,
k=0,...,Ki−1
. (A.3)
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An equilibrium σ∗ ∈ ∆ is traditionally said to be regular if the strategy set
Yi of each player i = 1, . . . , N is ordered so that y
1
i ∈ spt(σi) and the Jacobian
DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) is non-singular [4].
To see that the definition of a regular equilibrium given in Definition 12 co-
incides with the traditional definition given in [4], suppose that x∗ ∈ X is an
equilibrium of some game with utility coefficient vector u, and let σ∗ = T (x∗).
The Jacobian DxF˜ (x
∗, u) may be formed from DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) by removing the rows
of DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) corresponding to the coordinate maps F˜ 0i , i = 1, . . . , N and remov-
ing the columns of DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) in which the partial derivative is taken with respect
to σ1i , i = 1, . . . , N .
Using (A.1)–(A.3), (9) may be equivalently expressed in terms of strategies
σ ∈ ∆ as
F˜ ki (σ, u) := σ
1
i σ
k+1
i [Ui(y
k+1
i , σ−i)− Ui(y
1
i , σ−i)] (A.4)
for i = 1, . . . , N , k = 1, . . . ,Ki−1. Note that for i = 1, . . . , N , and k = 1, . . . ,Ki−
1, at the equilibrium σ∗ we have
∂F˜ ki (σ
∗, u)
∂σ1i
= 0.
This follows from (A.4) and the fact that for k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1, either
∂Ui(σ
∗)
∂σk+1i
= Ui(y
k+1
i , σ
∗
−i)− Ui(y
1
i , σ
∗
−i) = 0
or σ∗,k+1i = 0. Note also that by (A.2) we have
∂F˜ 0i (σ
∗,u)
∂σ1i
= 1 for i = 1, . . . , N and
∂F˜ 0i (σ
∗,u)
∂σ1j
= 0 for i, j = 1, . . . , N , j 6= i. This means that for each i = 1, . . . , N ,
the column of DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) in which the partial derivative is taken with respect
to σ1i is composed of all zeros except for a one in the row corresponding to F˜
0
i .
Thus, by the definition of the determinant (in terms of minors of the matrix), we
see that removing the above mentioned rows and columns from DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) does
not change the value of the determinant of the resulting matrix. Consequently,
DxF˜ (x
∗, u) is invertible if and only if DσF˜ (σ
∗, u) is invertible, and the equilibrium
x∗ ∈ X is regular as defined in Definition 12 if and only if σ∗ is regular as defined
in [4].
Appendix B.
This appendix gives the proof of Lemma 22 which shows that in potential
games regularity is equivalent to first/second-order non-degeneracy. The following
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definitions will be useful in the proof of the lemma. Given a carrier set C =
C1 ∪ · · · ∪ CN , let F
k
i and F be as defined in (16)–17. Note that for i = 1, . . . , N ,
k = 1, . . . , γi − 1 we have the relationship
F˜ ki (x, u) = Ti(xi)x
k
i F
k
i (x, u), (B.1)
where F˜ ki is as defined in (9). We now prove Lemma 22.
Proof. In order to simplify notation and minimize the overuse of superscripts,
throughout the proof we will use the symbol xˆ rather than the usual x∗, when refer-
ring to an equilibrium. Without loss of generality, given an equilibrium xˆ ∈ X, as-
sume that each player’s action set Yi is reordered so that carri(xˆi) = {y
1
i , . . . , y
γi
i }.
Note that this comports with the ordering assumption implicit in the definitions
of both first and second-order degeneracy (see Sections 4.1–4.2).
We begin by showing (ii). As noted in Remark 18, an equilibrium is first-order
non-degenerate if and only if it is quasi-strong, as introduced by Harsanyi [3]. It
was shown in [4] that any regular equilibrium is quasi-strong. Hence, (ii) holds.
We now prove (i). Assume henceforth that xˆ is a first-order non-degenerate
equilibrium.
Our goal is to show that
DxF˜ (xˆ, u) is invertible ⇐⇒ H˜(xˆ) is invertible. (B.2)
Given an x ∈ X, it is useful to consider the decomposition x = (xp, xm), where
xm = (x
k
i )i=1,...,N˜ , k=1,...,γi−1 and xp contains the remaining components of x. (The
subscript of xm is indicative of “mixed strategy components” of x and xp indicative
of “pure strategy components” of x.) Noting that
DxmF (xp, xm, u) = H˜(x),
where F is defined as in (17) with respect to the carrier carr(xˆ), we see that (B.2)
is equivalent to showing
DxF˜ (xˆ, u) is invertible ⇐⇒ DxmF (xˆ, u) is invertible.
With this end in mind, we will now consider the behavior of the component maps
of F˜ and F in two important cases.
Case 1: Suppose (i, k) is such that k ∈ {1, . . . , γi − 1}. Note that in this case we
have xˆki > 0. Differentiating (B.1) with respect to x
ℓ
j , (j, ℓ) 6= (i, k) we get
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xℓj
=
(
∂T 1i (xˆi)
∂xℓj
)
xˆki F
k
i (xˆ, u) + T
1
i (xˆi)xˆ
k
i
∂F ki (xˆ, u)
∂xℓj
(B.3)
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Since k ∈ {1, . . . , γi − 1}, we have F
k
i (xˆ, u) = 0 and hence,
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xℓj
= T 1i (xˆi)xˆ
k
i
∂F ki (xˆ, u)
∂xℓj
(B.4)
for (j, ℓ) 6= (i, k).
Differentiating (B.1) with respect to xki we get
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xki
= −xˆki F
k
i (xˆ, u) + T
1
i (xˆi)F
k
i (xˆ, u) + xˆ
k
i T
1
i (xˆi)
∂F ki (xˆ, u)
∂xki
(B.5)
By our choice of (i, k) we have F ki (xˆ, u) = 0. Also note that F
k
i (x, u) does not
depend on xki (see (16)), and hence
∂F ki (xˆ,u)
∂xki
= 0. By (B.5), this implies that
∂F˜ ki (xˆ,u)
∂xki
= 0. But we just showed that
∂F ki (xˆ,u)
∂xki
= 0, hence
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xki
=
∂F ki (xˆ, u)
∂xki
= 0. (B.6)
Together, (B.4) and (B.6) imply that for each (i, k) such that k = 1, . . . , γi − 1 we
have DxmF˜
k
i (xˆ, u) = T
1
i (xˆi)xˆ
k
iDxmF
k
i (xˆ, u), where xˆ
k
i > 0 and T
1
i (xˆi) > 0. This
implies that
Dxm
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=1,...,γi−1
is invertible ⇐⇒ DxmF (xˆ, u) is invertible.
(B.7)
Case 2: Suppose (i, k) is such that k ∈ {γi, . . . ,Ki − 1}. Note that in this case
we have xˆki = 0. Differentiating (9) with respect to x
ℓ
j , (j, ℓ) 6= (i, k) we get
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xℓj
= T 1i (xˆi)xˆ
k
i
∂
∂xℓj
[U(yk+1i , xˆ−i)− U(y
1
i , xˆ−i)] = 0, (B.8)
where the equality to zero holds since xˆki = 0. Note in particular that this implies
that DxmF˜
k
i (xˆ, u) = 0.
If we differentiate (9) with respect to xki and use the fact that xˆ
k
i = 0 we get
∂F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
∂xki
=T 1i (xˆi)[U(y
k+1
i , xˆ−i)− U(y
1
i , xˆ−i)].
Since xˆ is a first-order non-degenerate equilibrium, U(y1i , xˆ−i) > U(y
ℓ+1
i , xˆ−i)
for all ℓ = γi, . . . ,Ki − 1. Also, by our ordering of Yi we have T
1
i (xˆi) > 0. Hence,
T 1i (xˆi)[U(y
k+1
i , xˆ−i)− U(y
1
i , xˆ−i)] < 0. This, along with (B.8), implies that
Dxp
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=γi,...,Ki−1
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is a diagonal matrix with non-zero diagonal.
We now consider the Jacobian DxF˜ (xˆ, u). This may be expressed as
DxF˜ (xˆ,m) =
 Dxm
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=1,...,γi−1
Dxp
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=1,...,γi−1
Dxm
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=γi,...,Ki−1
Dxp
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=γi,...,Ki−1

By the above discussion we see that this matrix has the form
DxF˜ (xˆ,m) =
Dxm (F˜ ki (xˆ, u)) i=1,...,N
k=1,...,γi−1
M
0 D
 ,
whereM ∈ Rγ×(κ−γ) andD ∈ R(κ−γ)×(κ−γ) is an invertible diagonal matrix. Given
this block form we see that DxF˜ (xˆ,m) is invertible if and only if
Dxm
(
F˜ ki (xˆ, u)
)
i=1,...,N
k=1,...,γi−1
is invertible. By (B.7) we then see that DxF˜ (xˆ, u) is invertible if and only if
DxmF (xˆ, u) is invertible, which proves the desired result.
Appendix C.
Lemma 34. Let x ∈ X and i = 1, . . . , N . Assume Yi is ordered so that y
1
i ∈
BRi(x−i). Then: (i) For k = 1, . . . ,Ki − 1 we have
∂U(x)
∂xki
≤ 0, and (ii) For
k = 1, . . . ,Ki−1, we have y
k+1
i ∈ BRi(x−i) if and only if
∂U(x)
∂xki
= 0. In particular,
combined with (i) this implies that yk+1i 6∈ BRi(x−i) ⇐⇒
∂U(x)
∂xki
< 0.
Proof. (i) Differentiating (7) we find that ∂U(x)
∂xki
= U(yk+1i , x−i) − U(y
1
i , x−i) (i)
Since y1i is a best response, we must have U(y
1
i , x−i) ≥ U(y
k+1
i , x−i) for any k =
1, . . . ,Ki − 1. Hence
∂U(x)
∂xki
≤ 0.
(ii) Follows readily from (7).
Lemma 35. Suppose x∗ is an equilibrium and yki ∈ carr(x
∗), k ≥ 2. Then
∂U(x∗)
∂xki
= 0.
Proof. Since U is multilinear, yki must be a pure-strategy best response to x
∗
−i.
The result then follows from Lemma 34.
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